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Reid  studied  human  language  in  order  to  learn  important  facts 
about the human mind. ‘Language is the express image and picture 
of human thoughts,’ wrote Reid, and ‘from the picture, we may of­
ten draw very certain conclusions with regard to the original.’ He 
developed views on speech acts, language learning, natural and con­
ventional meaning, linguistic phenomenology, the relation between 
language and sense perception,  reference,  kind terms,  metaphor, 
and vagueness.
 Anticipating themes in speech act theory from the mid­twenti­
eth  century,  including J.L.  Austin,  Reid argued that  the  primary 
function of language was not to make assertions (what Reid called 
‘expressing a judgment’, a ‘solitary act’), but rather to perform the 
‘social acts’ of  questioning, commanding, and  promising. Human 
language’s ‘primary and direct’ purpose is to ‘express’ these ‘social 
operations of the mind.’ Reid lamented philosophers’ narrow focus 
on judgment and its content, the ‘proposition,’ at the considerable 
cost of neglecting the social acts.
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Reid defines human language as ‘all those signs’ which humans 
‘use in order to communicate to others their thoughts and inten­
tions, their purposes and desires.’ Reid divides these signs, and by 
extension language, into two categories: natural and artificial. Arti­
ficial signs are defined as those signs which have no meaning except 
for ‘what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those 
who use them.’ For example, the English word ‘star’ refers to stars 
because we agree that it  will.  Natural  signs are defined as those 
signs which, prior to any ‘compact or agreement, have a meaning 
which every man understands by the principles of his nature.’ Reid 
divides  natural  signs  into  three  basic  types:  ‘modulations  of  the 
voice, gestures, and features.’ Pointing is a gesture naturally under­
stood as calling our attention to the thing ostended. Reid’s natural 
signs closely resemble what Paul Grice later called ‘natural mean­
ing.’ To illustrate natural meaning, Grice used the example, ‘those 
spots mean measles’; to illustrate natural signs, Reid used examples 
such as ‘smoke is a natural sign of fire’ and a certain countenance 
on a human face is ‘a natural sign of anger.’
Reid argued that  natural  language has  priority  over  artificial 
language, because we must have a system of natural signs in order 
to learn or develop a system of artificial signs. Artificial signs must 
be invented and their meaning agreed among those who effectively 
use  them to  communicate.  But  in  order  to  agree on an artificial 
sign’s meaning, we must have some a prior way to achieve agree­
ment,  which  requires  communication,  which  requires  signs.  We 
might use already­existing artificial signs to do this, but this can’t 
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continue  indefinitely  in  the  case  of  humans.  Natural  signs  must 
have been the ultimate basis of the invention of artificial signs.
Reid made important observations about the phenomenology of 
fluent linguistic communication, which bear important similarities 
to his views on the phenomenology of ordinary perceptual cogni­
tion. Upon undergoing a sensation of hardness, we pay no attention 
to the sensation itself, and instead immediately conceive of and be­
lieve in the existence of a hard external body, which in no way re­
sembles the sensation. The body, not the sensation, commands our 
attention. The sensation is a sign of the body; by a ‘principle of our 
nature,’ we interpret the sensation as a sign of the body. Similarly, 
when someone speaks to us in a language we well understand, ‘we 
hear certain sounds’ but we ignore the sounds and instead ‘fix our 
attention’  on the  thing the  sound signifies.  For example,  when I 
hear someone say ‘stars’, I immediately think of stars, the heavenly 
bodies, which bear no resemblance to the word that signifies them. 
This is why Reid describes sensations as a ‘visual language.’ In this 
respect, Reid is a faithful student of Berkeley, who thought of visual 
sensations as a language by which God communicated to us for our 
benefit.
Reid divided all artificial words into ‘proper names’ and ‘gener­
al words.’ Proper names simply designate individuals in the world 
— they are mere signs or tags — and have no meaning beyond refer­
ence. Here Reid anticipates the Millian view of proper names and 
disagreed with Locke, who thought that all words signified ideas. All  
other words are general, according to Reid, including terms for gen­
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era and species,  predicates,  adjectives,  articles,  prepositions,  and 
conjunctions. Reid accepts that general words do have a meaning, 
which can be properly defined, which suggests that they differ im­
portantly from proper names.  However, there is some tension in 
Reid’s though on this point because he also claims that a general 
word’s meaning is nothing more than its referent: ‘to conceive the 
meaning of a general word, and to conceive that which it signifies, is  
the  same thing.’  Although the  meaning  of  a  general  term is  ex­
hausted by its  referent  — its  sense = its  referent  — the referent 
turns out to be a mental entity. General terms refer either to our 
conception of the attributes of individual things, as adjectives do, or 
to  our  conception  of  attribute  agreement  among  individuals,  as 
terms for genera and species do. A general term ‘expresses’ and ‘is 
the sign of a general conception.’
Everything  that  actually  exists  is  a  specific  individual,  Reid 
claims, and generality emerges initially only at the level of thought. 
General words owe their generality to the general thoughts they sig­
nify.  General  thoughts,  and in turn general  words,  can be  either 
precise  or  vague.  Vagueness  derives  not  from  generality  per  se, 
since there can be perfectly precise general terms, such as ‘triangle’. 
Rather,  vagueness  derives  from  sloppiness  or  indecision  on  our 
part,  either  individually  in  our  intentions,  or  collectively  in  our 
habits of common usage. By locating the source of vagueness in in­
decision or convention, Reid anticipates modern linguistic theories 
of vagueness. Reid also observed that vagueness can be beneficial. 
For  example,  precisely  defining  ‘human’  might  have  ‘unforeseen 
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consequences’ when enforcing laws. It might be better to leave the 
task of precisification to the discretion ‘of a judge or of a jury.’
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